

## Leadership in Homeland Security

### **“Developing a Leadership Toolbox for Aviation Security Field Management: The Case for Objective Measures of Performance at the Checkpoint”**

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#### Executive Summary

A number of “media-heightened” reports have recently added critical mass to the belief that the Aviation Security industry needs to explore and develop greatly improved security management policies and practices at our nation’s airports. The most highlighted of these critical reports reveal: (1) the U.S Government Accountability Office’s (GAO) criticisms of the Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) inability to mitigate security threats due to the absence of covert test result feedback mechanisms designed to improve security procedures and training, (2) high incidents of covert test failures reported by Homeland Security Inspector General’s Office, and (3) a major disconnect between upper level management and line workers opinions about agency effectiveness and morale as outlined by the Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey. In addition, many open forums on various travel blogs are dominated by past and present security officers lamenting on managers’ incompetence; specifically, their inability to be consistent in the treatment and performance measurement of subordinates when faced with the competing interests of security versus customer service. This paper reviews the possibility and importance of developing a performance management system that includes objective, real-time measures of performance at the checkpoint in order to better evaluate officers’ effectiveness and provide managers the necessary tools to manage and lead effectively.

#### Recent Performance Concerns in Aviation Security

With the TSA-wide emphasis on Risk-Based Security procedures that includes such controversial programs such as Pre-Check and Managed Inclusion, media reports of security failures within the agency have intensified over the past five years. Many of these security failures deal with officer performance issues within the security screening environment that are not adequately addressed when detected or not even detected at all due to a lack of measurement systems dealing with performance efficiencies/effectiveness on the floor.

Specifically, several media-intensive reports outlining performance concerns have emerged:

- (1) In 2008 and 2009, the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) published a report to the Chairman to the House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security that evaluated the efficacy of TSA’s risk-based covert testing programs. In conclusion, GAO criticized TSA for not developing a system that could

“systematically record reasons for test failures... , as well as test passes,” limiting TSA’s “ability to mitigate identifiable vulnerabilities.” The report states specifically that although a covert testing system is in place, inadequate data collection and documentation procedures during the tests resulted in the inability to record and analyze the specific causes of all national covert test failures, including TSOs not properly following existing screening procedures, screening procedures that are unclear to TSOs, or screening equipment that is not working properly. The report continues to state that, because of these deficiencies in data collection and analysis, TSA is “limited in its ability to identify specific areas for improvement.” Moreover, “without collecting and analyzing information on effective practices used at airports that performed particularly well on the national covert tests, TSA may be missing opportunities to improve TSO performance across the commercial aviation security system.”

- (2) In 2015, media coverage exploded with reports of an internal investigation revealing that "red teams" with the Department of Homeland Security's Office of the Inspector General were able to get banned items through the screening process in 67 out of 70 tests it conducted across the nation; a fail rate of 95%. Chairman of the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee, Jason Chaffetz, stated, “After spending over \$540 million on baggage screening equipment and millions more on training, the failure rate today is higher than it was in 2007. Something is not working.” Additional reports revealing gaps in screening of airport workers and TSA equipment being improperly maintained and/or managed soon followed, adding to the frustration with the agency. Questions about the “Red Team” test failures were directed to a DHS spokesperson who stated that “Red Team testing of the aviation security network has been a part of TSA’s mission advancement for 13 years.”
  
- (3) Department of Homeland Security (DHS) employees reported having lower average morale than the average for the rest of the federal government, but morale varied across components and employee groups within the department. Data from the 2011 through 2104 Office of Personnel Management (OPM) Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey (FEVS) -- a tool that measures employees' perceptions of whether and to what extent conditions characterizing successful organizations are present in their agencies -- showed that DHS employees had 4.5 percentage points lower job satisfaction and 7.0 percentage points lower engagement in their work overall. Engagement is the extent to which employees are immersed in their work and spending extra effort on job performance. Moreover, within most demographic groups available for comparison, DHS employees scored lower on average satisfaction and engagement than the average for the rest of the federal government. For example, within most pay categories DHS employees reported lower satisfaction and engagement than non-DHS employees in the same pay groups. Levels of satisfaction and engagement varied across components, with some components reporting scores above the non-DHS averages. Several components with lower morale, such as the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), made up a substantial share of FEVS respondents at DHS, and accounted for a significant portion of the overall difference between the department and other

agencies. Job satisfaction and engagement varied within components as well. For example, employees in TSA's Federal Security Director Staff reported higher satisfaction (by 13 percentage points) and engagement (by 14 percentage points) than TSA's airport security screeners.

In addition to these recently documented and highly publicized cases of performance problems within TSA, there is a great deal of anecdotal evidence from TSA screeners' security blogs that comment on the poor management skills of Supervisors, Transportation Security Managers and even some Assistant Federal Security Directors responsible for the oversight of screening activities at each federalized airport. In many of these cases, poor officer performance at the checkpoint is often blamed on TSA management's equally poor efforts at operational day-to-day oversight of security screening activities, lack of fairness and transparency in rating officers' performance on the Transportation Officer Performance System (TOPS) rating system, lack of mentoring and promotion opportunities, lack of performance-related feedback to help officer growth and advancement and an overall managerial/leadership disengagement about everything performance-related at the checkpoint. Many officers state that managers are caught between trying to serve two masters, one of security-awareness and one of customer service, which in turn creates confusion and difficulty in directing and identifying their security goals. This confusion, in turn, causes an environment of uncertainty and mistrust between officers and management, especially when performance appraisal reviews are involved.

Morale issues are prevalent for officers as well as staff under these circumstances. At one state-wide airport grouping involving a total of 15 airports, the number of formal grievances filed with TSA's National Resolution Center increased 400% shortly after the TOPS and Employee Performance Management Program (EPMP) final ratings were submitted to the program office in 2014. Much of this low morale related to grievances comes to the surface as low ratings on the Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey (FEVS) which, again, provides the documented disconnect between higher level management perceptions of morale and those of front line officers.

### Where is the Disconnect? What are the Identifiable Problems?

While many of these negative performance issues have surfaced in the public media over the years, TSA has been at the same time consistently recording highly successful performance scores during its Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA, Pub.L 107-71) mandated Annual Proficiency Review (APR) recertification exams for security officers. Indeed, first time pass rates on the Practical Skills Evaluation (PSE) certification tests are traditionally around 93% to 95% every year for all officers at each airport across the nation. Given the fact that officers know they are being tested in an often "artificial" environment and are given "practice" sessions by the evaluators prior to taking the PSE test, the question then becomes one of appropriateness or validity of the measures; specifically, "What is it that we (TSA) are actually measuring?"

The issue of validity related to APR certification testing becomes even more problematic when you look closely into the way APRs are conducted at each airport. Currently, APR

evaluators are selected and vetted by the Federal Security Directors at the same airports that they have worked in as officers and perform evaluations for each year. In some cases, the evaluator positions are an actual promotion for the individuals selected; and even in cases that they aren't, the position is still highly coveted by officers who are bored and frustrated with the daily grind and want to "get off the floor" to do something else. In addition to this, PSE first time pass rates have been used as one of several indicators of "overall airport (performance) health" in the monthly airport performance scorecard known as the Management Objective Report (MOR). MORs were designed as a general indicator of how well airports are being managed by the AFSDs and FSDs across the nation and are given a great deal of attention and emphasis by those at TSA headquarters in Washington, DC. Given the fact that these APR evaluators owe their positions to the same individuals that are being rated on management effectiveness by the airport scorecards (MOR), it becomes a huge conflict of interest that, no doubt, at least creates the potential for inevitable score inflation to occur. To compound this, APR evaluators are often conducting performance certification evaluations on officers that they have built up working relationships with over the years; another potential conflict of interest that could skew the results of such evaluations.

Certification tests were once used to set bonus amounts for officers during a performance program called Performance Accountability and Standards System (PASS). Results on a series of certification tests to include PSEs, Image Mastery Assessments (i.e., IMAs or x-ray image tests), On-Screen Alarm Resolution Protocol (OSARP) Mastery Assessments (i.e., OMAs or baggage image resolution tests) and Standard Operating Procedures Assessments (SOPAs) were once used to provide a total score of "performance" for each officer with the highest scoring officers receiving a certain bonus amount (depending on overall performance level) at the end of each fiscal year.

Criticisms of this process (the majority of which came from the screening workforce itself) amounted to the fact that there was no documented correlation between PASS test performance and real-life performance of officers at the checkpoint. Many officers cited "test anxiety" and "artificial test environments" as causal factors explaining their poorer performances in PASS as compared to their often supervisory and/or peer documented "exemplary" performance ratings at the checkpoint. Others believed that while some officers consistently scored higher on the PASS /APR tests each year, those officers weren't necessarily the same officers that performed well in day-to-day situations at the checkpoint.

In addition, Annual Proficiency Reviews (APRs) seemingly have no correlation to performance on the floor when compared to "Red Team" (covert test) results. Indeed, results across airports in the nation of 93% to 95% first time pass rates on the APRs seem to be in direct opposition to a 95% fail rate (67 of 70) on the recent covert tests of performance nationwide. While no research evidence is available to determine if a correlation does exist, officers often state that those working conscientiously hard on the floor are not the same officers as those who score high on tests of certification.

Indeed, anecdotal information gathered about officers' feelings about bonuses related to the certification tests and PASS-related bonus system varied from one extreme, for example, "I just passed the certification tests with flying colors, so there's absolutely nothing that I need to

prove on the floor because I am a lock to get my bonus,” to the other extreme of “I just failed the certification tests miserably, so I can care less about my performance on the floor because nothing can help me (to get a bonus) now.” Both attitudes are admittedly extreme ends from a spectrum of officer responses and attitudes, but they are fairly indicative of how officers generally felt about the bonus system and serve as strong examples to weaken any argument associated with the idea that certification tests have any correlation to true performance on the floor.

Along the same time that the AFGE union charter came into effect in 2012, the PASS bonus system was replaced by an equally ineffective TOPS performance appraisal system. By many accounts, TOPS is equally, if not more, problematic and incompetent in measuring and rewarding officers for their true performance on the floor. Many criticisms of the TOPS system include: (a) a measurement of “core competencies” and “performance goals” that are poorly defined and too subjective in nature; (b) poorly developed and implemented training for raters and ratees to adequately develop an understanding of the system; and (c) absolutely no standardization of raters and/or rating techniques which causes significant differences (i.e., variances) in rater abilities and/or backgrounds, which in turn, cause significant differences in the overall understanding of performance appraisal theories and measurement practices. For example, many STSOs that I have interviewed find it difficult to understand the performance standards given in the TOPS system that are intended to guide the rater into providing the correct score for the individual officer being rated. A good example can be found in the second core competency listed for TSOs titled “Integrity/Honesty”. In many cases, raters (primarily STSOs) cannot distinguish any difference between a rating of “3” listed as “achieved expectations”, “4” listed as “exceeded expectations” or “5” listed as “achieved excellence” given the performance standards written:

<p><b>Core Competency 2: INTEGRITY/HONESTY</b></p> <p>Behaves in an honest, fair and ethical manner; shows consistency in words and actions; models high standards of ethics.</p> <p><b>Performance Standards</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li> <p><b>Achieved Expectations</b> Respects and maintains confidentiality. Tells the truth and is consistently honest in dealings with internal and external parties and stakeholders (i.e., anyone who has an interest in transportation security, including but not limited to the traveling public, all TSA staff and management, local law enforcement, the local airport authority, and air carrier personnel.) Keeps promises and commitments made to others. Does the right thing even when it is difficult. Does not yield to pressure to show bias or to manipulate others. Does not misrepresent self or use position or authority for personal gain. Meets expectations for adhering to ethical standards in the workplace, as defined by the <i>TSA Guide to Major Ethics Rules 2014</i>.</p> </li> <li> <p><b>Achieved Excellence</b> Respects and maintains confidentiality. Tells the truth and is consistently honest in dealings with internal and external parties and stakeholders (i.e., anyone who has an interest in transportation security, including but not limited to the traveling public, all TSA staff and management, local law enforcement, the local airport authority, and air carrier personnel.) Keeps promises and commitments made to others. Does the right thing even when it is difficult. Does not yield to pressure to show bias or to manipulate others. Does not misrepresent self or use position or authority for personal gain. Meets expectations for adhering to ethical standards in the workplace, as defined by the <i>TSA Guide to Major Ethics Rules 2014</i>. By example and role-modeling, encourages co-workers and others to earn trust and respect through consistent honesty in interactions with internal and external parties and stakeholders (i.e., anyone who has an interest in transportation security, including but not limited to the traveling public, all TSA staff and management, local law enforcement, the local airport authority, and air carrier personnel.)</p> </li> </ul>
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On many occasions, raters (STSOs) would make the following statement(s): “What exactly is the difference between a 3 and a 4 or 4 and a 5 when it comes to being honest and having integrity? You either have integrity or you don’t. You are either honest or you’re not.

There are no varying degrees of this concept. Therefore, I will rate everyone a 3 because to be honest, I have no clue as to what they are trying to measure here.”

In addition to these systemic problems, many operational problems exist that are specific to various airport (e.g., Regional Director, FSD) influences. Anecdotal evidence can be found that suggests organizational concerns about “score inflation” resulted in inconsistent and undocumented verbal messages/warnings being given to raters that the “average of evaluations given should be ‘around the total score of 3’ since most people are “average performers”. Airport FSDs were later informed as to how close they were to the mean/average scores of appraisals given throughout the organization. In addition to this concern, TSA organizational policy states that a rater must give acceptable/approved documentation supporting ratings that deviate positively or negatively from the central score of “3”; while no such documentation/proof is necessary for scores of “3”. The cumulative result of such messages and/or policies is difficult to measure, but one can easily postulate a serious concern with the validity of the overall system given the undocumented inconsistencies and unequal pressures that some raters faced at airports across the nation.

According to anecdotal information volunteered at one federalized airport, many of the supervisors (STSOs) tasked with rating TSO performance in the TOPs program stated that they rarely, if ever, get to observe the checkpoint performance of the officers they are being asked to evaluate due to being on differing work shifts or locations. When pressed for more information on how they successfully rate the officers, the STSOs stated that they relied on the input from fellow STSOs, any available performance data such as TIPs scores and/or “a general feeling about the officer.”

Many officers, in turn, often state that they rarely get any feedback about their performance prior to and even after being rated in the TOPs program by their immediate supervisor. Even for those receiving the mandatory “feedback” sessions related to the TOPs program, once or twice per year does not amount to a great deal of timely information about an officer’s performance concerns and does not promote or drive any performance improvements that are sustainable over time. Due to this issue, officer morale suffers and a general “performance malaise” follows with officers and supervisors alike becoming “disengaged” from the overall process.

Despite training (such as the mandatory Essentials of Supervising Screening Operations - ESSO class for supervisors) and TSA’s response to DHS demands for implementing competencies related to STSOs’ abilities to perform as mentors in helping officers’ development on the floor (see Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General Report 12-128), little traction has been achieved in the actual implementation and sustainability of that goal. In a vast majority of cases dealing with officers’ performance failures on the floor, evidence still exists that such performance failures are often handled through punishment (ranging from letters of counseling to multiple-day suspensions without pay) and “remediation programs” designed to re-educate officers about the standard operating procedures; often scheduled with and conducted by the TSA training department instructors with little or no interaction from the offending officer’s immediate supervisor.

As if these performance management weaknesses were not enough, even the training programs designed to “remediate” officers for performance failures have come under scrutiny. In spite of TSA being almost a decade and a half old, there is still no mechanism in place for the feedback of performance results to determine if any training program implemented within TSA (to include remediation of performance failures) is effective in changing officer behaviors and increasing performance on the floor. Known throughout the training industry as Kirkpatrick’s Level 3 evaluation of training, feedback on the “transfer of training” from classroom information/knowledge to actual changes in performance on the job is important to determine the effectiveness of the training material presented to TSA officers. Yet to this day, no Level 3 evaluation of training is currently performed within TSA’s training department strategy.

Relative to specific performance feedback such as the covert testing program, the results have not been well integrated into the performance management and improvement of officers’ daily skills and abilities. While “Red Team” tests have been a “part of TSA’s mission advancement for 13 years,” the details of them have rarely, if ever, been shared with training departments at any of the airports across the nation. Vast amounts of valuable data were never assimilated and used to help improve local training programs within TSA.

To put it succinctly, TSA has no measurement of true work performance on the floor, and hence, no way to evaluate the Level 3 “Transfer of Training.” The Office of Inspections’ Red Team and regulatory Inspections’ ASAP test results are not collectively fed back into the system and without their aggregated data, we do not have any true measure of on-the-job work performance or Level 3 evaluation of training.

Without this data, we have no way of knowing whether the current training program objectives are meeting the desired goals of the organization or even if the current organizational goals are accurately defined. Without true measures of performance, we can never be sure that the TSA mission goal of “mitigating the threat” is operationally defined correctly and effectively.

All of the performance management issues and weaknesses listed above amount to TSA’s Transportation Security Managers lacking the necessary tools in their “leadership toolbox” to manage effectively. Without the ability to consistently monitor and track behavior over time and control performance outcomes on the floor, the only option for supervisors and managers (and the only tool in their management toolbox) is to provide disciplinary actions as a means for affecting change.

With increases in disciplinary actions across the nation, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has confirmed its commitment to correcting work performance issues within the organization. According to a recent GAO study between the years of 2010 and 2012 involving TSA employee misconduct data, the annual number of TSA misconduct cases increased almost 27% from 2,691 to 3,408 per year.

According to the same report, offenses related to screening and security accounted for 20 percent of the total number of cases. As defined by TSA, charges for screening and security related incidents pertain to violating standard operating procedures, including not conducting security or equipment checks, and allowing patrons or baggage to bypass screening. More times

than not, cases involving screening and security failures resulted in suspensions of a definite duration and/or the employee's removal from TSA.

While it is entirely appropriate for TSA leadership to address serious performance issues with this type of disciplinary action, such a significant increase in instances in a relatively short period of time begs for several questions to be asked; two of which are the focus of this report, specifically: What are the root causes of such screening and security lapses at each airport, and perhaps more importantly, what is leadership at each airport doing to identify the root causes and prevent these types of issues from occurring in the first place?

### Correcting the Problems

If we are going to develop good leaders at each airport across the nation in TSA and support the type of environment for good leadership, complete with timely feedback of performance and mentoring of officers, to develop and grow, then we must first build and make available the necessary tools for leaders to use and be successful. Currently, the generically-developed performance appraisal systems of TOPS and EPMP, and the bonus allotments tied to them, are simply not cutting it. In order to change the officer culture on the floor from one of concern for getting caught and punished for doing something wrong to concern for meeting set standards, increased performance goals and positive reinforcement, then TSA must put into place the behaviors and psychological support, as well as a performance evaluation management system, that foster officer accountability for individual performance.

Kip Hawley, past TSA Administrator, said in a recent interview, “In today's TSA, too many officers switch off their minds in favor of just finishing out the shift without rocking the boat. This may be the root cause of the GAO-identified misdeeds. TSA needs to have its officers switched-on and motivated.” In addition, Kip Hawley stated, “The pay-for-performance system for transportation security officers needs to be reinstated. When transportation security officers unionized, merit pay was replaced by the seniority system -- essentially, if officers follow the standard operating procedure, they get regular pay raises up till retirement regardless of how well they perform.”

While the author of this paper disagrees with Mr. Hawley that a “merit pay” and/or “pay for performance” system was truly ever in place at TSA (if his comments are directed at the PASS-related bonus payouts already discussed in this paper), the focus of developing one (if objective, real-time measures of true officer performance are used and in place) is one of the issues of this point-paper.

Specifically, this paper proposes the need for local performance management programs to be developed and set into place at each airport in order to help answer the root causes of poor performance and offer local leadership an avenue for correcting those concerns.

A well-defined Performance Management Program is vital in helping field leadership to: (1) set standards of performance for officers to follow, (2) communicate those standards to each officer, (3) provide timely and consistent feedback to allow officers an understanding of how their performance compares in relation to those set standards, and (4) hold each officer

accountable for his/her individual performance and develop goal setting programs for officer improvement where needed.

A locally established Performance Management Program provides a method to do all of the above and also provides field leadership an avenue in which to communicate performance standards, goals and recognize achievement.

According to a recent meta-analysis of Gallup Research on employees in the United States workforce, 70% of American workers are 'not engaged' or 'actively disengaged' and are emotionally disconnected from their workplaces and less likely to be productive (Gallup, 2013). Through research efforts to discover what motivates employee engagement, the Gallup organization identified the following 12 factors.

According to these findings, most professionals want:

1. To know what's expected of them \*
2. To have the tools they need to do their work
3. To have the opportunity to do what they do best every day
4. To receive recognition and praise for doing good work \*
5. To be seen and valued as people (not just job functions)
6. To have someone encourage their development \*
7. To have their opinions count
8. To feel that what they do is important and worthwhile
9. To have coworkers who are committed to quality work \*
10. To have positive work relationships
11. To talk about their progress and receive feedback \*
12. To have opportunities to learn and develop \*

At least half of these (items identified by an asterisk) can be directly achieved through a consistent and timely Performance Management Program and communication process. Performance Management is the systematic process by which any organization or agency involves its employees, as individuals and members of a group, in improving work performance and organizational effectiveness in the accomplishment of the agency's mission and goals.

Good performance management programs include:

- defining work expectations and setting standards for performance,
- continually monitoring performance (collecting data on set performance measures),
- periodically rating performance in a summary fashion and providing feedback,
- setting goals for improvement,
- the possibility of rewarding good performance.

When communicated properly, a set standard of performance should drive the work outcomes and performance of employees. However, in any organization, supervisors/managers are often challenged by employees who are not performing up to standards set into place. When

this occurs, developing and implementing a performance management program can be an important step towards performance improvement and achieving organizational goals.

A performance management program, in and of itself, is primarily an accountability system. It shows everyone from senior executives to front-line employees what operational results they are accountable for (i.e., standards of performance) and sets expectations for how they should go about achieving those results.

In addition, consistent communication between upper level management/leadership and lower level employees about performance standards emphasizes the importance of performance goals and objectives to the work force. The axiom that workers pay attention to what upper management is paying attention to is true in the work environment that utilizes a performance management program. Continually monitoring performance through the collection of set performance measures and providing feedback to officers on their performance is the only way to assure that communication about the importance of meeting performance standards does, indeed, occur.

Providing feedback is an important step in the performance management process. Timely analysis of performance data and feedback of that data back to the workforce allows for accountability to occur.

Finally, a good performance management feedback system can communicate the commitment back to employees through the use of rewards and incentives for meeting and/or exceeding superior performance goals.

As with any organization that implements a sound performance management program, TSA can also reap the benefits of such a system. Through the consistent and timely analysis of employee performance, field leadership (supervisors/managers) can determine weaknesses that lead to security lapses and/or failures in the system that may affect an officer's performance. Once identified, leadership can then determine methods and/or develop strategies for helping to prevent their occurrence and mitigate their effect on operational performance.

#### A Research Study: Proving Our Point?

To determine if a performance management program with the main focus of STSO oversight of officers' performance and collection of performance-related data on the floor is a viable solution to establishing and driving a culture of performance increases at the checkpoint, TSA Pittsburgh (PIT) conducted an experiment of those concepts in 2009.

As a key component of the research study, a Quality Assurance (QA) form was specifically designed to measure officers' performance of various "practical skills" associated with performance of airline passenger security screening at the checkpoint. QA monitors, instructors associated with the PIT Training Department, were then put into place to collect data on officers' true performance on the floor.

First, several key questions needed to be addressed to determine if performance on the floor was different than officers' performance on Practical Skills Evaluations (certification tests) taken in a more structured and sterile environment; thereby validating our assertion that a performance management program incorporating true objective measures of performance on the floor is necessary to improve on day-to-day deficiencies of TSO performance.

They were:

- (1) Is there a difference between officers' PSE performance of skills during certification testing and their "on the floor" performance of skills?
- (2) If there is a difference in performance, does it reflect a decrease in performance from PSEs to day-to-day floor operations?
- (3) Does overt observation of officers' performance of key checkpoint screening activities by management help to reduce the amount of errors being committed on the floor?

The experimental design developed to answer each of the questions stated above involved a comparison of the number of officers' errors between different group conditions.

(A) Group conditions:

- (1) Control Group – the number of errors for each selected officer on the HHMD and FBPD components of 2009 Practical Skills Evaluations (PSEs);
- (2) Comparison Group – the number of errors for each selected officer on the HHMD and FBPD activities on the floor and recorded without the officers' knowledge (i.e., during covert observation of skills at the checkpoint).
- (3) Experimental Group - the number of errors for each selected officer on the HHMD and FBPD activities on the floor and recorded with the officers' knowledge (i.e., during a previously announced and overt observation of skills at the checkpoint).

(B) Evaluators:

The lead evaluator and data collector was a Security Training Instructor (STI) previously trained and certified as a Practical Skills Evaluation (PSEs) evaluator during the FY 2009 PASS year.

(C) Measures of Performance:

The STI involved in the study developed a "skills evaluation checklist" (SEC) for use in evaluating officers and collecting data for the study based on the same performance evaluation methodology used during PSEs for FY PASS 2009 and 2010. It was meant to be similar so that results obtained in this research study could be compared with previous results found for the PSEs in 2009 at PIT.

Like the PSE evaluations, the SEC records the number of mistakes or "dings" (operationally defined as instances when an officer forgets to perform a certain screening task or

does not perform that task up to minimally set standards as defined by TSA) that occur during a specified screening activity (e.g., Hand Held Metal Detector, Full Body Pat Down, etc.) conducted by the officer. “Dings” or errors in screening performance resulted from a number of incorrect procedures or mistakes to include: failure to issue proper advisements, failure to clear all required areas, performing procedures in a hurried and incomplete manner resulting in improper screening procedures and lack of adequate “coverage” as outlined in the Checkpoint Standard Operating Procedures (SOP).

We had looked into developing a method for listing the SEC on a palm pilot for ease of use and to test the feasibility (e.g., time to evaluate, validity of data capture and entry) but could not get permission to add the applications on a secured computer system. Therefore, all evaluation data for the study was collected by hand using a paper format.

#### (D) Data Collection Method

All SEC data for the comparison and experimental groups was collected on a random sample of officers at the Pittsburgh International Airport (PIT) main checkpoint location. The names of the officers in each group (Comparison and Experimental) were collected so that their scores on the 2009 PSEs could be used to represent the data in the Control group.

Performance evaluation for the Comparison Group occurred in week one of the study and “covert observation” occurred during this first week of data collection. By running test bags through the checkpoint x-ray machines, the TSOs were unaware that the evaluator was performing covert observations of their screening techniques. Data collection was recorded at the checkpoint podium and away from the view of the officer performing the screening procedure.

Performance evaluation for the Experimental Group occurred in week two and “overt observation” occurred during this period of data collection. Before the second week of observation began, official word was disseminated to the work force by the Training Manager stating that a team of observers would be making random observation of screening functions at the main Checkpoint and evaluating performance. As a result, TSOs were aware that evaluations were being performed on their work behavior during this period of time. Data collection was recorded directly in front of the officer while he/she performed the screening procedure.

Table 1 reflects the “mean number of errors” on two measure of performance, Hand Held Metal Detector (HHMD) and Full Body Pat Down (FBPD) for each group condition in the research study.

The data shows a significant increase in number of errors between the control and comparison (i.e., covert observational techniques) for both HHMD and FBPD screening activities. The Control group mean number of errors for HHMD evaluation and FBPD evaluation were 1.30 and 1.52 respectively. The Comparison group (data collected using covert observational techniques) mean number of errors for HHMD evaluation and FBPD evaluation increase substantially to 5.90 and 3.60 respectively.

However, Experimental group (data collected using overt observational techniques) mean number of errors for HHMD (m = 2.96) and FBPD (m = 1.67) decrease almost back down to the baseline numbers found in the Control group. This phenomenon of reduction of errors during overt observation of officers skills performance is similar to a previously documented research study by Palmer & Terrell (September, 2008).

**Table 1. Results of the SEC Study (Means for Each Group on Two Measures of Performance)**

GROUP	N (HHMD)	Mean HHMD "Number of Errors"	N (FBPD)	Mean FBPD "Number of Errors"
CONTROL GROUP (2009 PSEs)	44	1.30	27	1.52
COMPARISON GROUP (covert floor observation)	31	5.90	10	3.60
EXPERIMENTAL GROUP (overt floor observation)	25	2.96	21	1.67

The significant difference in scores between PSE tests (conducted away from the checkpoint in an “artificial” screening environment) and the comparison (covert observation) test group lends strong support for adding a QA approach for measuring true performance on the floor. Data measuring true screener performance on the floor is necessary for developing an accurate Level 3 evaluation of training. If PSE data were used (which is collected in an artificial environment) for the Level 3 evaluation of training, a true and accurate assessment of the training curriculum cannot be made.

The reason for this is that we do not fully know why there are significant differences in performance between the PSE scores and those conducted covertly on the floor. Many theories exist for this difference, but most are related to a belief that there is a general lack of motivation to “do well” by the officers on a day-to-day basis. Some anecdotal evidence suggests that officers do not have the same focus during screening procedures on the floor than they do while performing PSEs that are tied to their PASS performance bonuses. Without specific incentives to “do well” on the floor, motivation to perform to high standards may be lacking. There is evidence that officers tend to “go through the motions”, cutting corners and performing minimally acceptable standards while conducting screening on the floor, simply because there is no incentive or motivation to do any better. This complacent attitude is not new and surely isn’t unique to PIT. Many TMs across the country have expressed the same concerns and see the same type of complacency in their screeners attitudes about performing their job when compared with their effort during PSEs .

Notes taken by the evaluator during the covert data collection describe this concern:

“During the course of approximately 80 evaluations, the following non-standard behaviors were observed: failure to issue proper advisements, failure to clear all required areas, officers performing procedures in a hurried and incomplete manner resulting in improper screening of procedures, and observed complacent attitude regarding procedures (i.e. order of coverage).”

Whatever the reasons may be, one fact holds true from the research results provided; in order to determine the true state of “training transfer” from classroom to floor, only data of true floor performance such as that obtained by using the QA measurement approach can be used for Level 3 evaluation of training. However, there seems to be an added bonus to the QA effort that should be discussed here.

While a significant increase in mean number of errors was found for both screening activities of HHMD and FBPD between the control group (PSE scores) and the comparison group (covert observation), this difference in mean number of errors decreases and almost disappears during overt observations of the officers performance in the experimental group is conducted.

This is an interesting phenomenon and suggests that the differences occurring between PSE performance and performance on the floor are correctable in some way and due to factors not associated to “knowledge” of how to do one’s job per se. Again, the theory about lack of motivation on the floor could be a feasible reason for the differences, but without further study and analysis, it cannot be proven as the definitive reason.

Nonetheless, the research presented in this paper suggests that increased performance on the floor could be obtained by simply putting a QA measurement system into place. A greater payoff may even be realized if the QA measurement system is tied to some type of performance management system complete with a monetary incentive program.

#### Building an Objective Performance Management Program and Developing a Leadership Toolbox

To further address the perceived need for a performance management program utilizing true, day-to-day, objective measures of performance on the floor, Pittsburgh International Airport (Greater Pennsylvania Area) developed a pilot-program called the PIT Performance Management Program (PPMP).

The PPMP is a metrics-driven system designed and implemented at the start of Fiscal Year 2013 (October, 2012) to collect data on various indicators of individual officer’s on-the-job performance. The database management/tracking system of the PPMP produces monthly performance reports on officers in order to:

- (1) Communicate set standards of performance to the officers (clarify job responsibilities and set expectations for performance)

At its most basic level, the PPMP conveys a message to the officers that leadership cares about various measures of on-the-job performance (“We are watching, therefore, you need to be watching”). It is a traditionally held belief that officers will focus on certain areas of performance that they believe to be most important to management. The very act of providing feedback on PPMP results emphasizes the importance of those areas of performance in the officers’ minds. Through the use of this concept, leadership can more effectively clarify job responsibilities and set expectations and/or standards for officer performance and provide a basis for achieving goals for improvement. In addition, the PPMP provides leadership with a platform (e.g., an opportunity to formally interact at set intervals of time) to better inform the workforce about any changes that may occur in the standard operating procedures of the job.

Improving workforce communications and increasing manager-officer engagement are key components of the PPMP.

- (2) Develop a culture of accountability and responsibility (enhancing individual and group productivity)

The goal behind the PPMP is to take existing, identifiable performance measures and track them consistently over time to develop a metrics system that management can use to identify high performing Transportation Security Officers (TSOs) and Supervisory Transportation Security Officers (STSOs) with the highest performing teams – as well as the low performing TSOs and STSOs with the lower performing teams. The overall idea was to provide an available database of who is doing well and who isn’t, especially at the supervisory (team) level.

STSOs are tracked over time on how well they and the officers on their teams are performing; which in turn, naturally helps to develop a culture of accountability and responsibility for performance goals of the organization. Individually, the PPMP was gradually viewed by the workforce as a numerical representation of how each officer’s performance could affect the operational effectiveness of TSA PIT as an organization; and, that the performance of each officer has an impact, positively or negatively, on how well TSA PIT operates as a whole. The average monthly “performance score” for an officer on the PPMP is an indicator of that impact. By receiving feedback on where his/her PPMP score stands in relation to average team scores and/or average TSA PIT scores, an officer is afforded a better understanding of how well he/she is performing within the organization and within specific areas of performance that he/she may need to work on to improve. Organizationally, the entire goal and/or effect of this “understanding” is to develop a culture of accountability and responsibility relative to overall officer performance and align employee behaviors with TSA’s core values, goals and strategies.

- (3) Provide supportive feedback designed to help develop the officer to his/her fullest capabilities

The PPMP was designed specifically to give “constructive feedback” to officers on their individual performance as it relates to the performance of TSA PIT as a whole. While it was not designed as a resource for punitive actions, it could be used by Transportation Security Managers (TSMs) and STSOs to provide feedback to help officers improve and develop their skills in targeted areas of performance, if necessary. This feedback could be given within standard goal setting approaches, and was designed to help officers improve in areas of performance that may have been weaker or below average when compared to the performance of others.

For those officers doing well in all areas of performance measurement, the PPMP monthly reports generated by the program manager specifically direct STSOs to reach out to their officers and “offer words of encouragement and praise” for their strong efforts which, in turn, can achieve important positive results in worker morale.

(4) Align developmental and/or remedial opportunities with resources at hand;

Currently, most if not all deficiencies in performance that lead to discipline and/or lack of certification as an officer are dealt with by sending that officer to an obscure “remediation” effort provided/conducted by the TSA training department at each airport. More times than not, these remediation programs (by no fault of the training departments) are often detached both in timeliness and effectiveness which result in poorly executed efforts that provide no lasting effect on performance improvement for the officers involved.

It is widely believed within the organization that timely feedback and interaction between STSOs and poor performing officers, with supervisors taking a more active role in the training and mentoring of subordinates, is a more effective way in dealing with performance issues and/or concerns. Greater STSO involvement in performance issues on the floor is a key issue in the use and development of the PPMP.

(5) Potentially reward officers for consistently good performance.

The PPMP was associated with “six month challenge periods” that provided time-off awards to officers achieving “above average” performance ratings on the PPMP. Conceptually and operationally, if an officer consistently scored above his/her team average and airport-wide average on the performance measures used in the PPMP during a specified six-month period of time, that officer was presented with a “time off” award for his/her efforts. Awards depended on the availability of time off amounts, if any, allotted to the airport for any time period specified by TSA headquarters.

So, how does the PPMP work?

To address both effectiveness and engagement within the organization, Pittsburgh International Airport (PIT) developed the PIT Performance Management Program (PPMP) that promotes interaction and/or accountability of supervisors and officers through the tracking/feedback of various measures of daily work performance.

The first, and probably most important, goal of the PPMP is to get mid-level managers (i.e., TSMs) and STSOs actively involved in guiding/mentoring the performance and developmental growth of officers performing the job of Transportation Security Officer (TSO).

The second goal of the PPMP is to develop a sense of behavioral “accountability and responsibility” in all officers for their daily activities related to on-the-job performance.

If queried, the greater majority of officers would probably state that they are above average in the performance of their duties. This is a natural occurrence found in the human resource management reviews of all 360 degree-style measures of personnel performance. This phenomenon exists simply because, in general, employees usually have no information to compare their own performance relative to the performance of others in the same organization and will always believe that they are above average. Unless provided with evidence to the contrary, employees will not hold themselves accountable and/or responsible for any subpar performance evaluation and/or any operational failures suffered by the organization as a whole. The PPMP is developed and utilized to correct this type of mindset through the use of continuous and consistent communication/feedback about individual performance information; comparing an officer’s performance data to team and organization-wide averages in order to produce cognitive dissonance within the below-average performing officers over their generally held beliefs about their performance. Theoretically, once officers are provided an opportunity to understand their individual performance relative to the total average performance as a whole and are treated with respect during their feedback session, they begin to develop a sense of accountability for their performance and responsibility to perform better.

Supervisors are then asked to provide structured guidance on specific performance issues to those officers who need to perform better in order to improve and meet organizational standards (i.e., average performance of team and organization). This structured guidance may involve (when necessary): (1) observing officer work behavior on the floor and taking immediate corrective action (in the form of constructive feedback) personally with that officer, (2) tracking officer performance and establishing an improvement plan complete with a goal setting approach, (3) scheduling formal remediation/refresher training with the established training department, and/or (4) providing a mentoring experience by pairing the officer up with another high performing officer on the same team.

In theory, the PPMP establishes a system in which all TSA PIT performance metrics systems (including TOPS and EPMP) dovetail together. A number of PPMP performance measures are already included in the TOPs/EPMP performance systems and the PIT strategic management plan – all based in measurable, identifiable and objective performance standards. Since each TSA performance measurement system links together (from TSO to FSD staff) throughout the operational chain of command, each member of the organization has a stake in improving the performance of those who report to them, primarily because their performance, in turn, depends on the performance of others within that command. Getting officers to develop through behavioral change to improve performance is the overall goal of the PPMP.

#### Current PPMP Measures of Performance

The performance measures currently used by the PPMP are mostly well-established and previously developed/utilized by TSA. Only one measure, known as the Quality Assurance (QA) assessments, was developed locally by the TSA PIT Training department.

The PPMP includes the following measures (with definition):

- (1) X-ray Image Performance or Threat Imaging Projection (TIP) scores – measured by the number of threat images detected (Pd) divided by the number of total threat images presented;
- (2) Reliability – measured by the number of tardiness instances and unscheduled leave instances per officer within each month;
- (3) Training Performance – measured by the National Training Plan (NTP) on-Line Learning Center (OLC) completion percentages for each officer by month.
- (4) Checkpoint and Baggage Performance Quality Assurance (QA) assessments – measured by specific checklist measures of screening proficiency developed by the PIT Security Training Instructors (STIs) and closely resembling the same evaluative checklists used during officers' Annual Proficiency Reviews, including assessments involving threat area searches, standard and modified pat down procedures, Persons With Disabilities (PWD) screening, L3 Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) divestiture and screening officer procedures, OSARP and ETD/physical search of bags, oversized bag procedures, etc.
- (5) Covert Tests – measured by pass/fail performance on basic and intermediate Aviation Screening Assessment Program (ASAP) test results on officers conducted within the evaluation month.

#### Generating a monthly PPMP Performance Score on Each Officer

Data on the measures is collected on each officer by airport “data managers” and entered into a customized Access database in order to generate a monthly report outlining officer, team and airport overall performance.

Each month, the PPMP uses data on the first four measures of performance listed above to produce an average “total score” (sum of all performance scores divided by the actual number of measures collected) for each checkpoint and baggage only and dual function officer employed.

Points associated with the fifth measure, ASAP test results, are added to or subtracted from the averaged “total score” after it has been computed for each officer involved in an ASAP test during the month. This is done to give “greater weight or emphasis” to the ASAP tests as true measures of performance.

Officers are grouped by checkpoint and/or baggage “teams”; and, each team has one STSO as its “PPMP leader”. All of the officers listed under a specific STSO in the TOPS performance evaluation program make up an STSO’s “team”. Each STSO “team” gets an overall total score which is based on the average of all officers’ scores that are members of that specific STSO’s team.

#### PPMP Reporting: Providing Consistent and Timely Feedback

As a reminder, the primary goal of the PPMP is to make STSOs accountable for taking action with each of his/her officers over performance-related concerns; building a performance-based relationship with the officers and hopefully affecting performance-related behaviors of officers conducting their job duties on the floor. The PPMP helps STSOs to accomplish this goal by providing consistent and timely feedback of officers’ performance on the floor.

The PPMP generates monthly reports for each checkpoint and baggage STSO’s team. Each STSO team score is compared to the others and an overall “team ranking” is provided via email to all TSA officers, managers and FSD support staff at the airport. This “team ranking” is designed to build team comradery, pride and friendly competition of all officers and teams involved. It also allows officers to understand how their own individual PPMP score compares with the averages of team performance scores and the overall PIT airport performance score for the month.

This message, along with its attachment outlining the performance measures for each officer is designed to give STSOs timely, in this case monthly, feedback on the work performance of his/her team, officers that he/she supervises and of his/her own screening efforts. STSOs are asked by management (via the PPMP program manager) to use the feedback report to review the performance results with officers on his team.

STSOs are specifically held accountable for communicating performance related issues with each officer, using the report as a reason for that interaction. STSOs are asked to offer “words of encouragement and praise” to those officers doing well; and more importantly, to address performance-related weaknesses on his/her team by providing feedback and goal setting plans to officers not performing as well as they should be; paying particular attention to those officers showing consistent weaknesses over time.

Within the PPMP report itself, each “team” score (average of all officers’ scores on that team) is listed so that each officer can immediately compare his/her own score on the report to the team average. STSOs use this report to determine the relative strengths and weaknesses of each officer on his/her team, acting on the information to provide further review and feedback with each officer.

When reviewing the report, STSOs ask themselves the following performance questions:

- (1) Is each officer’s PPMP score higher or lower than my team average?
- (2) Is each officer’s PPMP score higher or lower than the PIT airport average?

- (3) Is there a specific performance area where each officer is stronger or weaker in than other officers on my team?
- (4) Does any officer show a consistent weakness over time (comparing data from previous monthly PPMP reports) in a specific performance area?
- (5) Which officers deserve praise for their consistent high performance or improvement?
- (6) Which officers need feedback, guidance and possible goal setting in order to help improve?
- (7) Is it necessary for me to observe and evaluate any officer on an area of lower performance as indicated on the PPMP report?
- (8) What steps do I need to take to make each officer better in a low performance area?

### Quality Assurance (QA) Assessments: Timely Feedback for Situational Awareness

The Quality Assurance (QA) assessments were designed to evaluate screening performance similar to the Annual Proficiency Review procedures in officers performing their daily duties on the floor.

The Security Transportation Instructors (STIs) at the PIT training department, with direct oversight from the Program Analyst/author of this article, combined the Annual Proficiency Review (APR) practical skills evaluation (PSE) checklists with the new hire training program (NHTP) on-the-job training (OJT) skills evaluation checklists and the current standard operating procedures (SOPs) to develop a number of local PIT QA evaluations for checkpoint and baggage operations.

To date, ten different QA checklists have been developed for evaluating officers performing the following TSA PIT security-related duties: Standard Pat Down (SPD), Persons with Disability (PWD) Standard Pat Down, Modified Standard Pat Down (MSPD), Threat Area Search – Checkpoint, AIT L3 Divestiture Officer, AIT L3 Screening Officer, Travel Document Checker (TDC), Pre-Check MSPD, Oversize Baggage and On-Screen Alarm Resolution Protocol (OSARP).

The PIT STIs were directed to use these checklists and collect Quality Assurance data for the PPMP on officers performing their duties on the floor for approximately one-half of their “floor time” mandated each month by TSA OTWE.

The QA process collects valuable information on the actual screening “strengths and weaknesses” occurring on the floor each day at the PIT checkpoint and baggage work locations. QA data is collected by the STIs and the number of “incorrectly performed” procedures are tabulated and presented in a table which is then shared by the Performance Management Program Analyst with those in the screening operations chain of command to include the FSD, AFSD-S, TSMs and STSOs. This timely feedback of actual screening strengths and weaknesses allows for immediate action to be taken by the screening management team to correct any behavioral screening deficiencies that may occur with officers scored on the assessments and possibly prevent any serious systemic problems from developing due to incorrect screening procedures. This “situational awareness” is an important component of day-to-day management oversight of screening operations.

The PPMP Program Analyst uses the QA feedback report to point out several things to the STSOs and TSMs:

- (1) The number of QA assessments performed by the STIs during the month;
- (2) The number and percentage of officers obtaining a perfect 100% score on their QA assessment versus the percentage getting less than 100% scores;
- (3) Average QA scores for all officers evaluated (airport average);
- (4) The percentage increase or decrease in the QA performance for the month in comparison with previous months;
- (5) Advice on how to use the data to provide feedback to officers possibly needing corrective action to improve.

This feedback allows screening operations personnel to focus in on the areas of strengths and weaknesses overall at PIT and the checkpoint/baggage “environment” during the time that the QAs assessments were conducted.

Additional information provided to TSMs and STSOs shows the SOP references for each of the missed and/or incorrectly performed screening activities/items of officers during the QA assessments. This breakdown of missed items relative to each SOP reference gives TSMs and STSOs immediate feedback on what knowledge and/or skills need to be addressed for each officer having less than 100% accuracy on his/her QA assessment.

By conducting QA assessments, the PIT Performance Management Program identifies the weaknesses in security screening activities at the checkpoint and baggage work environments and provides immediate feedback to officers so that performance weaknesses can be addressed in a timely fashion.

#### Linking the Chain: The PIT STSO Performance Management Program

While the TSO version of the PPMP had been in place for approximately one and a half years at PIT (2012-2014), the STSO version of the PPMP is still in developmental stage.

As stated before, the performance management program at PIT is designed to link all daily performance issues from TSO on up the chain of command back to the yearly performance management systems currently used by TSA. After the TSO PPMP was put into place, the next logical step was to develop a performance management program for the supervisors (STSOs).

The goals behind the implementation of the PIT STSO Performance Management Program (STSO PPMP) are primarily to establish a working environment at PIT that solidly puts into place the learning/management objectives of the Essentials of Supervising Screening Operations (ESSO) class for STSOs. More specifically, the STSO PPMP at PIT is designed: (1) to get STSO’s more involved with observing and evaluating work performance and behaviors of officers on the floor, and (2) to build a mentoring environment between supervisors and officers so that constant feedback is provided. This feedback/mentoring environment is important in day-to-day operations to help shape the work behaviors, knowledge and performance of officers.

Over a period of six months in FY2014, the author met with PIT Transportation Security Managers (TSMs) to plan and build the STSO PIT Performance Management Plan. Several brainstorming sessions produced a number of objective performance measures that could possibly be used to define and evaluate important areas of STSOs day-to-day performance. After careful review and analysis, the final performance measures were selected and presented to STSOs for discussion, feedback and review. The STSO PPMP database was then designed and developed and a test period started in June, 2014.

The STSO PPMP is divided into three separate “Critical Performance Areas (CPAs)”. CPA 1 is labeled “Supervising Operations” and covers many of the direct supervisor/management goals related to screening and baggage efficiency and supervisors remaining active in the feedback and control of quality assurance measures. Measures of Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) efficiency, Expedited Screening efficiency and Baggage On-Screen Alarm Resolution Protocol (OSARP) efficiency, as well as STSOs follow-up actions related to the Quality Assurance (QA) results are objectively measured in CPA 1.

CPA 2 is labeled “Operational Knowledge” and tracks measures of STSOs’ working knowledge such as OLC completion rate, SOP quiz results and attendance at intelligence briefings.

CPA 3 is labeled “Communication” and contains measures developed to evaluate the performance of STSOs in several areas dealing with written and verbal communication to include conducting shift briefings and writing incident reports and disciplinary actions.

TSMs may use the STSO PPMP as an additional measure to help determine the overall effectiveness of each STSO under their command. The use of the STSO PPMP, in theory, can help TSMs to have more meaningful information available as a reference when conducting performance review calculations associated with the yearly EPMP.

#### Conclusion: The Need for Local Performance Management Programs at the Field TSA Airports

The need for specific and focused management tools such as those obtained by the collection and evaluation of objective performance data is ever present if TSMs and STSOs are going to be effective in providing leadership and mentoring opportunities to the officer workforce. The current screening focus highlighting Risk-Based procedures such as real-time security threat analysis and alternative decision-making is strongly dependent on these types of leadership and mentoring opportunities if it is to prove sustainable and successful.

In addition, growing concerns at the TSA headquarters level over officer discipline and various other performance management issues has underscored the need for ongoing feedback of these issues that should occur more frequently than what is currently happening with the TOPS/EPMP national performance programs.

In order to fully realize the benefits of headquarters-inspired training initiatives that are being developed and implemented at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) such as the Essential of Supervising Screening Operations (ESSO) training program, each airport needs to provide the tools necessary for TSMs and STSOs to be able to manage and lead. The Performance Management Program developed and implemented at Pittsburgh International airport is designed to be such a tool.

If TSA is going to make progress on improving the performance of its officers in day-to-day operations on the floor, it needs to build and implement the tools necessary to help foster the concept of performance management to its workforce. The PIT TSO and STSO PMPs are designed to provide operational direction based on the timely and consistent analysis of productivity and effectiveness of the security strategy at each airport. The measures used within the STSO PPMP are also designed to monitor metrics on processes and technology usage. The Quality Assurance assessments within the TSO PPMP help to examine significant findings that indicate weakness or significant successful accomplishments in deterring security risks, improving administrative or security processes/procedures, and compliance with current regulations and SOPs.

In summary, use of both PIT PMPs (TSO and STSO), help the organization to achieve both operational efficiency, effectiveness in relation to performance of SOP standards, and frequent feedback and engagement of the workforce. The PPMPs help to provide an environment in which management (TSMs and STSOs) interact with the workforce in a timely and efficient manner. Immediate feedback of performance issues and concerns allows for the mentoring process to occur and development of skills from STSOs to officers. The PPMPs also help to develop and nurture a culture of accountability and responsibility for performance within the workforce.