After years of working nuclear security issues across Eastern Europe, Robert Wagner went before the U.S. Helsinki Commission in March 2026 to update them that Russia’s war on Ukraine has transformed nuclear power plants into tools of coercion, and what that means for the U.S. and allied security.
Wagner (MA 1905/1906, REP2501) is a recent graduate of the Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Program and served as a panelist during the Commission’s March 16, 2026, briefing, “Nuclear Power and Nuclear Powers: Lessons from Ukraine,” held on Capitol Hill. The discussion focused on Europe’s largest nuclear facility, the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), and the erosion of international nuclear safety norms during armed conflict.
The invitation reflected years of work Wagner has built across both operational experience and academic study.
A former Indianapolis firefighter and paramedic, Wagner now serves as a U.S. Army civilian and Navy Reservist. His career spans emergency management, countering weapons of mass destruction, and Eastern European security. From 2022–2024, he supported the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program as a nuclear and chemical security expert in Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Armenia, including service as deputy exercise director for Armenia’s 2024 Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Exercise.
That background shaped his work at CHDS.
“I came in with a topic already in mind,” Wagner said. “I wanted to study something that mattered—and something I could take outside of the classroom.”
That topic was Ukraine.
“So far, this war is showing us that nuclear power plants are no longer just energy infrastructure—they are now potential military targets.”
–Robert Wagner, MA1905/1906, REP 2501
Wagner’s REP project examined how Russia’s invasion exposed critical vulnerabilities in nuclear infrastructure, particularly at ZNPP, which Russia seized early in 2022 and has largely shut down since. Before the war, the plant generated roughly one quarter of Ukraine’s electricity. Its loss has turned energy infrastructure into a strategic weapon.
In his opening statement to the Commission, Wagner emphasized that nuclear plants in war zones are no longer just civilian energy assets.
“So far, this war is showing us that nuclear power plants are no longer just energy infrastructure—they are now potential military targets,” he said.
His assessment went further. Wagner argued that the most immediate danger posed by nuclear facilities under adversary control is the cascading civilian impact of losing power, heat, and essential services.
“The more immediate danger posed by reactors in war zones may not be radiation,” he told the Commission. “It may be darkness.”
Wagner examined the vulnerabilities to reactors uniquely created by military activity in modern war. He explained that even when a reactor stops producing power, it still requires sustained cooling—dependent on external power, backup systems, and continuous water flow—until it reaches a cold shutdown. Disrupting these supporting systems can halt cooling and create serious risks, as seen at Chernobyl and Fukushima.
“The question isn’t just whether someone can damage a reactor,” Wagner said later. “It’s what happens if you disrupt everything around it.”
At ZNPP, Russia has exploited that reality. Wagner described how Russian forces transformed the plant into a fortified military position while leveraging nuclear safety concerns to deter counterattacks and influence international decision‑making.
“Russia has transformed a critical piece of Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure into an instrument of nuclear coercion, piracy, and blackmail,” he said.
The Helsinki Commission briefing placed Wagner’s analysis into a broader policy context. The Helinski Commission is the governmental body which monitors compliance with the Helsinki Accords and advances security through cooperation on human rights, democracy, and military, economic, and environmental issues across 57 participating states.
The March briefing focused on what’s at stake at ZNPP. Control of the plant could determine not just how the war ends, but how Ukraine rebuilds—shaping whether it remains dependent on outside energy or regains its role as an exporter. That’s an outcome Russia is working to prevent.
Panelists also pointed to a deeper concern: the failure of international institutions to counter Russia’s use of nuclear coercion, despite Ukraine’s decision in the 1990s to give up its Soviet-era nuclear weapons under the Budapest Memorandum.
For Wagner, the moment before the Commission was a direct extension of his CHDS experience.
“The program gave me the motivation and the platform to take the work beyond the classroom,” he said.
Today, that work is reaching policymakers shaping U.S. responses to nuclear risk, critical infrastructure, and modern conflict. Wagner’s path—from REP research to a national-level briefing—reflects what CHDS stands for: developing leaders who turn academic work which influences national defense and security solutions.
