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Workshop: Electric Power Grid Resilience

Workshop organized by The Naval Postgraduate School Center for Homeland Defense and Security

Monterey, CA                    17-19 May 2010

Paul Hines, Ph.D., University of Vermont
Speaker

Motivation

The electric power grid resiliency workshop held May 19-21, 2010 at the Center for Homeland Defense and Security, Monterey, CA., precipitated a number of ideas that the workshop participants wish to make available to a wider audience of citizens, policy-makers, and legislators for the good of the country. Accordingly, the group has initiated a follow-on activity to produce a "policy paper" to be more widely circulated to the public. The following summary of the workshop lists the problem and recommends an approach going forward.

Problem Statement

The United States faces numerous, complex energy security challenges in the 21st Century. Central to those challenges is the National Security requirement that the nation continue to function even during catastrophic naturally occurring events, unintentional man-made calamities, and asymmetric physical or virtual threats or attacks perpetrated by nation-state or non-nation-state actors against assets, systems, or networks.

The nation’s critical dependency on the commercial electric power grid to achieve its global mission is very well established. Since most of the bulk power infrastructure nodes and systems are commercially owned, identifying and remediating the vulnerabilities that characterize this dependent relationship require complex partnership arrangements with industry. In addition, the electricity sector is critically dependent on the communications, transportation, water, and chemical sectors in terms of output and continuity-a fact that extends vulnerabilities to these sectors. Electricity sector risks and disruptions include those caused by inherent attributes of the infrastructure itself, as well as a variety of naturally occurring and man-made causes, whether deliberate or accidental in nature.

Frequently, electric power is primarily supplied by commercial service providers tied to the bulk power system, with on-site back-up diesel generators used during short-duration commercial power disruptions. Diesel back-up generators are typically not designed to support extended outages of the grid. Therefore we need a new approach in partnership with industry.

Additionally, the nation is in the midst of significant electric power grid upgrades, system expansions, integrating various renewable generation sources, and bringing on intelligent metering and control systems to increase efficiency and reduce demand management. Yet, the electric power grid remains vulnerable to physical and cyber attacks. Key nodes in the electric network, such as the substations located in remote areas with little physical protection, are viable "targets" to criminals and terrorists. Key components in a substation consist of large transformers, circuit breakers, and the substation control house, which are all readily identifiable from outside of the chain-link fence protection and easily accessible once the protective fence is breached. Cyber intrusion can also damage transformers, transmission lines, electric breakers, and generators by causing electric overloads. Electric overloads will either destroy grid components or cause a reduction of equipment life expectancy.

Brady Downs, LCDR, USCG
Speaker

The question is, what should "future grid" be in order to accommodate intelligent, e.g., SmartGrid, technologies, maintain resilient power for the consumer, while decreasing the vulnerabilities to homeland security and defense missions?

  • What are best practices are necessary to achieve these objectives?
  • What national policies should the US put in place that will get us from the "grid of 2010" to the "optimal grid of the future?"
  • What technologies best serve to increase grid resilience?
  • What can/should we do to increase mission efficiencies, increase grid reliance, reduce demand, develop technologies or practices that can be leveraged to meet these national goals?
  • What can/should the federal govenment do to increase mission efficiencies, increase grid reliance, reduce demand, develop technologies or practices that can be leveraged to meet these national goals?
  • What are the "best case" effects of a national grid policy and technology insertion to reduce vulnerabilities?
  • Can our reliance on imported fuels be increased?
  • Can our reliance on new technologies increase homeland security?
  • Can our reliance on new technologies assist homeland defense and reduce vulnerabilities to defense missions worldwide?
  • Can the federal government play a positive role in grid improvements? How?
  • Can industry rise to increase grid resilience?
  • What technologies best fit our current regulatory environment?
  • What legal/regulatory changes must occur to make "future grid" possible?

Approach

The focus is on the anticipated impact of a renewable and clean energy future on energy production and distribution, specifically via the electric power grid. The fundamental approach is to identify an end-state or "vision" of an optimal electric power grid and work backward to the present day. Working backwards from the end-state to the present state will identify milestones that must be met in order to get to the future state. We can then decide what policies are needed today that will take us to the end-state.

The end state is roughly defined as a production and distribution system with the following characteristics:

  • 1. Energy independence: 90% of the energy consumed by the US is also produced by the US;
  • 2. Clean: CO2 emissions equal to or better than the Kyoto Protocols
  • 3. Resilient: Energy production and distribution reliability is "5 nines" reliable (no more than a few hours per year of outages), and cascade failures are containable (controlled islanding via load shedding, etc).

There are multiple visions of what the future power grid might look like. Rather than postulate distinct "scenarios", for our purposes this paper use the visions of the writers. In order for this paper to be useful in the future development of policy, we will build our collective vision through the series of questions posed in the previous section within the Steps below.

Step #1; Vision of Future Grid

What is the optimal future grid? An Incrementally Robust Grid? A collection of Micro Grids? Government Electric Power Inc? The objective here is to define the aspects of the most resilient, most efficient grid possible. It is anticipated that this vision will encompass the incorporation of two-way communication and a sophisticated computer and sensor control network for sensing and adjusting the flow of electrons throughout a national grid that has incorporated intermittent generation from wind, solar, natural gas, nuclear, etc. sources. New technologies will be incorporated as they become available, e.g. "smart transformers", etc. The vision could also incorporate a variety of base power, intermittent power, and storage facilities focused on support of localized micro grids. New technologies are designed to address this new architecture and incorporate a variety of sources of power.

Step #2; Relevance to National Security/Defense

The vision of "Future Grid" will have a significant effect on national security and national defense policies. In the case of national defense, the Department of Defense has a continuing reliance on commercial and defense infrastructures to complete its worldwide missions. Achieving these many requirements depends on a reliable grid. National Security, as expressed in our reliance on commercial ports under the purview of the US Coast Guard, has a similar dependence on a reliable and efficient grid. "Future Grid" must serve the mission needs of the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security. What policies must be in place for "Future Grid" to enhance our National Security and National Defense?

Step #3; Enabling Technologies

Achievement of "Future Grid" depends on expansion of existing technologies, the development of new technologies, integration of complex generation, transmission, and distribution systems, and new security protocols, standards, and systems. While some currently exist but require efficiency increases, e.g., photovoltaic power generation and storage systems, and other technologies currently only laboratory experiments, e.g., fusion power generation, it is essential that major technological advances are envisioned and achieved. What are these technologies?

Step #4; Enabling National Security and National Defense Policies

In terms of the big picture, our recommendations aim to drive toward a "National Energy Policy" at the national level. What policies are necessary to build and protect the grid? To assure that the grid enables and enhances the US Coast Guard missions to protect our ports? To assure that defense facilities have reliable power for their missions? To integrate our public and private grid research and development?

Many ideas were discussed by the participants. These centered on a handful of critical elements.

  • 1. Transformers
  • 2. Storage
  • 3. Cap banks
  • 4. IT integration
  • 5. PMUs/RTUs
  • 6. Transmission policy
  • 7. Demand-response
  • 8. Renewable energy
  • 9. Breeder technology

A follow on meeting was recommended to develop recommendations to the White House.

Presentations on Video
Presentation VideoPower Grid Basics
Thomas Overbye,

Presentation VideoMSRAM Risk Assessment Tutorial
Brady Downs, US Coast Guard

Presentation VideoKeynote Address
Michael McDaniel, State of Michigan









Presentation VideoCyber Exploitation
Jonathan Stanford, U.S. Dept. of Energy, Bonneville Power Administration

Presentation VideoA System Dynamics Approach to Analyze and Protect the European Energy Network
Alexander Loechel, University of the Bundeswehr - Munich

Presentation VideoA Resilient Power Grid - A National Perspective
Stephen Flynn, Center for National Policy

Presentation VideoIndustry Perspective on Security
Matt Thomson, GE Energy

Presentation VideoSmart Grids in Europe: Interdependencies and Vulnerabilities
Stefan Brem, Federal Office for Civil Protection